Sunday, June 19, 2011

My Ethics


           I will defend various stand points which cross my ethics and moral standing with today’s environmental ethics. The first view which has shaped my identity with nature and my environment is the understanding of value. In my last writings, “Lee’s Intrinsic values on Troika Thoughts (paper 1),” I discussed how value is recognized objectively and subjectively by writers J. Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston’s. I also discussed how Keekok Lee successfully refuted how the source of locus is not generated by humans but rather recognized in articulated manner. This established the metaphysics that existences of instrumental Value in nature is independent of the existences of humans and the existence of intrinsic value in nature is also independent of the existence of humans. Now that I have established value as being pre-existing, I also want to get more into detail in discussing  my views in which are ratified by different types of value. Such values are recognized by anthropocentric (human centered-) and non-anthropocentric views. Keep in mind that subduing myself to such values as further described incorrectly can affect my moral stand considerations (environmental practices)  with the environment and also be used against myself by counter arguments. For example, I am a true believer in value 100% but to treat all things equally valuable is a hard task at the moment.  This would mean to me that I could not eat meat on the basis that I value the existence of life and to eat meat would be contrary to that belief because in doing so I am ending a life in which I recognize in having intrinsic value. Because this is the case, I will use Eugene Hargrove’s framework in which he discusses different types (1.Non anthropocentric instrumental value 2.Anthropocentric instrumental value 3 Non Anthropocentric intrinsic value 4. Anthropocentric Intrinsic value [Hargrove page 135]) of value and how I associated myself as being a weak anthropocentric.

       
            When I wrote my first paper, I discussed the source and locus to examine how we are not the center of value and where value generates from. My main conclusion was to establish that value is pre-existing and so forth. But this does not necessary mean we cannot generate other values aside of pre-existing values. Yes, intrinsic value is a self generating value that Lee bases on the integrity to strive and live. If you are reading my paper now, realize that you are sustaining life independently as a moral agent (means morally capable of making choices) and just simply being alive demonstrates self intrinsic value. Drinking a cup of water also demonstrates an example protecting that self intrinsic value. Your body needs water to regulate body temperature and to provide the means for nutrients to travel to all your organs. Water also transports oxygen to your cells, removes waste, and protects your joints and organs. Drinking water protects and keeps that intrinsic value alive (based on your integrity to live). Another type of value is instrumental value; this is value in the generating scene or could be describe as “for one’s own good”. Such example is X serves Z and in becoming that purpose can be described as instrumental. Callicott argues that all of these two terms are subjective terms and human generated. I disagree in Callicott’s thesis that instrumental/ intrinsic value is self generating by humans because it ignores pre-existing value Callicott also confuses this argument by extending this view that even as valuers we are all valuers of the same living community. He examines how this leads to the possibility that Humean/ Darwinian bio- moral metaphysics is correct and that values can be conferred by humans without being necessarily centered by humans/ or from an anthropogenic stand point. This is a clever attempt to separate him from being an anthropocentric. It also leads to a slippery slope. Counter parties would be free to eradicate non anthropocentrism’s existing frame work by simply saying “hey I’m a non-anthropocentric, because I come from the same material and we are all from the same nature,’ thus distorting the difference of both opposing views. Also, this fails to address objective recognized instrumental and intrinsic values and makes scientific findings arbitrary or none the less nonfactual by not recognizing pre-existing scientific evidence of value. This would also ignore the three point five millions years of value that has existed without humans. My ethics/ metaphysics leans towards Lee’s thesis that humans are not the only loci and bearers of intrinsic value. A lion has the ability to recognized its own integrity to live and strive; they do this when they choose their pray or thus as cubs would decide which types of lions they become (alpha male, single pack). Such ability demonstrates intrinsic value. It’s our special ability as humans to articulate this process vs. lions who lack certain cognition skills to see this process as clear as we do. This has allowed us to establish moral consideration for lions in the past, present and future. Now I do believe that Callicott is correct in the sense that we do generate and articulate some instrumental and intrinsic value, but this is aside pre-existing values in nature or in us. These values can be further expressed as aesthetic values. This is where my argument can be extended to Hargrove’s framework in which I consider myself a weak anthropocentric (slightly human based centered) because my views are both in moral consideration from a humanperceptive and non human point.
               
                 Though objective values pre-exist, we should also consider how value is recognized through the lens of both an anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric stand views. Anthropocentric views on value can be recognized as a value which serves humans or derives from a human stand view. For example, in our reader provided by Professor Bill Anelli on page 31, there are scriptures provided from Genesis which state “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish and the sea. And over the birds and the air, and over every living thing that lives upon the earth.” This is the mindset that what you’re doing is what you’re supposed to do. This view is an argument by authority, because their figure of authority “God” told them this is okay (fallacy of thought for enjoyment [fallacy I made up]) and also very anthropocentric based on the needs of humans dominating the earth. There are many people who are this way and do not realize that they are anthropocentric (kind of like fish don’t know they are fish). There are also non anthropocentric values which are supposed to be bias free of human self centered stand points. As Lee discussed in the “Source of Locus,” these views are not assigned by human judgments but can be recognized articulated values separated from a human judgments. Such example of an evaluated value would be a prey species to a predator. Both Hargrove and Lee meet eye to eye on this account. Now that I have explained the difference of APV and NAPV, I would like to emphasize that I made of both parties. I would like to place myself in a developing “weak anthropocentric” view, which in sense allows me to have the best of both worlds without limited my abilities to think only one way. This notion is expressed by Hargrove who believes that an anthropocentric intrinsic value theory is necessary to include non-living beings in the moral account. Hargrove states that “as long as a non anthropocentric theorist concentrate on the class of living objects, nonliving beauty will continue to be left out, and will require anthropocentric intrinsic value attributions in order to receive any protection at all,” (Hargrove pg 137) thus illustrating that we should take a degree of both worlds into account. This carries onto a being able to integrate ideas which are essentially aesthetic and how nature’s beauty should be valued intrinsically. From here, value can be assigned or attributed from the chart above. And when speaking aesthetically, I would relate to those terms with having respect for nature because of its pre-existing intrinsic and aesthetic value; not as Callicott describes as having respect for nature in a “subjective born” manner.

           As described above, my qualities are made up of different elements in which contain different positions by various philosophers. I understand that philosophers are at a constant wind trying to interpret how value originated (intrinsic and instrumental) without jeopardizing any existing framework in place.  I do appreciate how Lee draws his diagram of value and how it is existing without humans in a nonhuman world. This is not to say that subjective value cannot be created by humans aside its existing value already in place. I myself create subjective value in the very nature I love which has value already existing in itself. This is an anthropocentric view that takes existences only because that love for nature serves me and brings me pleasure as a human. Such unique positions can be seen aesthetically and objectively valued as Hargrove describes; to separate them completely would be ludicrous and as comparable to almost forcing our love out of nature by always remaining too objective. We can also reconnect through our objective reasoning and use this for moral standings- but having different cherishing views allows us to be more independent and makes us more individual.

               Value can also be shared amongst very both human and nonhuman. Value is the bridge in which crosses me into both worlds and allows me to have moral consideration for both sides of a human and nonhuman world. When a bridge of value falls, it marks a loss of value in a life that has either become threatened or extinct. In general cases, it’s normally nonhuman’s creatures that are at the constant threat of the humans who fail to see past anthropocentric views. Now, we may rebuild a new bridge of value to replace a fallen one, but will always have to bare the consequences for not having moral consideration for nature and the community of non nonhuman living species. And some bridges are of course irreplaceable. Other noticeable consequences today are global warming, the extinction of true habitats or natural forests and most importantly the loss of value from these consequences. Without value- we tend to lose both an objective stand and an aesthetic view for what we are fighting for. The very framework and threshold is centered on value, without value we can only imagine it as Callicott would in a subjective manner-dreaming of a world we once loved. Without placing individual ethics in place, we can become a world of humans without nonhumans around to value. In this worse case scenario, humans will exist without value vs. the constant debate that value cannot exist without humans. Perhaps the extinction of value is the real war and by saving value we can save everything else that comes in existence of value.   

Friday, June 10, 2011

Lee’s Intrinsic values on Troika Thoughts

Keekok Lee discusses three main perspective views on how value is determined and presented in modern day environmental ethics. Lee is also very successful in comparing and contrasting his own view with both J. Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston’s distinguish views of the source and locus surrounding intrinsic value. The first argument presented by Callicott is fueled by the idea that “humans consciousness is the source of all value” and that “value is no more then a subjective feeling of human individuals” (Lee [Callicott 142]). This argument is made to draw a comparison with Rolston’s view. This is done by introducing how Rolston takes different approaches by making the powerful analysis that “humans are merely the beholders of the value” and that “nature is the locus and the source of value” (Rolston 142). This carries on to the idea that humans may have discovered items in which have value already; this value is one that is preexisting without humans. Lee also draws in a third argument which based on an “argument of metaphysical queerness” against the “objectivity” of values. Lee seems to be successful in using all three hypotheses in what appears to be numerous dialectical critics /counter arguments. He uses the framework of all three scholars against each other and then uses the framework of all the authors to build his own conclusion. This is very clever.

In these three arguments, Lee does not necessarily have to be persuasive or use a degree of rhetoric to lure his audience towards his target. Lee takes a more inviting approach of this argument by elaborating and exploring the differences of these three arguments. This allows the readers to see these respectful insights of how value may be interpreted from these philosophical perspectives. After Lee explores these three ideals, he smoothly conveys me into agreeing with his final conclusions by using the existing framework of the previously discussed philosophers. Yes, there is more then one conclusion being made by Lee.

Lee discusses how Callicott completes an argument by informing us that natural beings are members of the same biotic community; sympathy for fellow members can be therefore be extended to fellow members of the same biotic community. In other words, Callicott want his readers to understand that because we are all from the same living community-it is possible that Humean/ Darwinian bioempethic moral metaphysics show how it is possible for values to be conferred by humans without being necessarily centered by humans/ or from a anthropogenic stand point. Rolston denies this and argues it is “a fallacy of the misplaced location of values” (Rolston pg 142). This is where the argument of nonhuman nature is described as not the locus but the source of value and that humans discovered such values but do not generate them.

Lee exemplifies how sources should be seen from a Cartesian/ Kantian thesis of rational linguistic capacity posse by humans and how to resolve the conflict of between Callicott and Rolston. Lee discusses how there are two types of value: A) being valuable “for itself,” and B) being valuable “in itself.” He then examines the ladder between humans and nonhumans in which are connected with the integrity to strive. Lee continues to dive deep on Value in which I interpreted on two very complex levels. The first is articulate value being recognized by consciousness, reason and capacity for language which is unique and related to humans. This is being valuable “in itself” and recognizing articulated value as described in letter B. The second type of value is based on nonhuman nature and its possession of intrinsic value as described being valuable “for itself” (A). These are mutely enacted values. This view supports Rolston’s theory of value that nature is the holder of value and that humans are the beholders of value. This where Lee takes some of the existing framework in recognizing articulated and mutely acted values and builds his argument concerning non anthropogenic views and so forth. Lee expresses that this fails to address articulated value and mutely enacted values. He also continues to describe and define value from his perceptive which bears some similarities with Rolston’s theory. The formula Lee provided, which yes, helped dearly, is described as “object O is to an entity, A, in satisfying an end goal, then O has instrumental value for A. If A stands for a human agent and O for a rabbit or a tree, then the nonhuman part of nature clearly has instrumental value for human agents” (Pg142-143). Lee then go’s to elaborating how A may also stand for a “nonhuman agent, such as an animal and O for a bush” (Lee Pgg 143); thus illustrating that nonhuman objects can also share this enacted value with other nonhuman objects. In my words, this here is the birthstone of nonhuman objects being able to sustain value regardless of lacking cognition, consciences or subjective feelings. This here can be described as instrumental value because object A is at value to object B or vice versa- even with the absent of humans. Lee continues to describe if instrumental value exist without humans, then intrinsic value which can be characterized as instrumental value must also exist without humans. After retouching the surface, I liked how Lee reestablishes his main theses to guide his readers. Below I have outlined the main points as Lee does on page 143 before entering section 4.

  1. The existences of instrumental Value in nature is independent of the existences of humans
  2. The existence of intrinsic value (a) in nature is also independent of the existence of humans
  3. It follows from (2) that humans are not the only source of values
  4. It follows from (1) & (2) that humans are not he only loci r bearers of intrinsic value

Lee continues to add other counter-arguments in which describe deeper meaning of how nonhuman animals cannot recognize “a good of one’s own.” This concept is having the ability recognize instrumental value in action. The problem is others argue that nonhuman animals cannot be capable of understanding intrinsic value as humans can from a human mindset. A cat can recognize the mouse it eats, as a bird can recognize the worm it ate or a human can be recognized as a snack for a tiger. This “good of one’s own” is visible to nonhumans only in this sense. Lee argues that beings can be bearers of intrinsic value here, and then animals clearly are such bearers of intrinsic value themselves. Being unable to simply exemplify such features does not mean that intrinsic value is void. In the ethics of Kant, it just means that humans are capable of pondering issues based on our moral, wrong from right or justice. To agree with this hypothesis is agreeing that humans are the only ones unique enough to recognize intrinsic value and are the source of it. Lee finds this troublesome because it ignores the value of our planet which was preexistent before humans. This ignores a world that is nonexistent of humans or a time that was post-human. Lee clearly is now challenging what Callicott calls scientific naturalism. Scientific naturalism is the arbitrary projection of human feelings or emotions which Callicott bases his argument on. This becomes more subjective and confines science/ and value to just human projections.

Lee continues to discuss the metaphysics of science naturalism and value vs. disvalue. He gives an example of how we can clearly see how a plant and animal maintain their function and integrity. This is the process of intrinsic value. He then goes on to describe how the absence of human consciousness makes no difference of this integrity. He also describes the absence of humans means the absence of regret or loss. This leads to a biotic point of nature that there is value and disvalue and that earth is not value free. This leads to another projection of human feeling towards the world. Lee believes that recognizing disvalue with our own attitudes simply is just instrumental value. This is a part of preserving our functional integrity and this world. He then weighs value and disvalue on two relevant aspects on page 144. Lee states, “in the absence of humans and their unique type of conciseness’ and reason, value (whether instrumental or intrinsic) are simple mutely enacted in the world” (Lee pg 144) . Our cognition, ability to think or articulate this process begs the question that nature is here to serve us. This complicates the issue and confuses me as the reader. But then Lee taps into how this new dimension does not necessarily mean it is no longer a projection of human feelings, thoughts or cognition but rather a modification of scientific naturalism. Our human consciousness is the source of “recognized articulated value.” It should be noted that this value is not simply the arbitrary product of humans but a discovery made by humans. Lee also discusses this would be contrary this scientific naturalism to study it subjectively instead to study this world objectively.

Lee closes his publication by reinstating his conclusion in section 6 and 7 (pg 145). He briefly discusses his main points: recognizing articulate values in contrast with mutely enacted values, distinguishing Callicott and Rolston’s stand on value and assessing the metaphysics of scientific naturalism. I enjoyed Lee’s concluding words that human and nonhumans are have intrinsic value as to instrumentally mutual value with each other. He even discusses that the earth’s biota has been here longer then our current existing time of human history; it is only our unique consciousness that allows us to see this.

Monday, May 16, 2011

Indian Tribes Vs. Christians

Indian Tribes Vs. Christians

      The original California Indian tribes are described as peaceful and caregivers of nature. For example, Central Indians recognized as the Pomo's were often displayed reticent & phlegmatic attitudes. Their Chief actively preached towards peace and having humbleness towards nature. Though Abrahamic Christians also took a peaceful and religious perspective on life, they still fought for hundreds of thousands of years against each other in attempt to ratify beliefs.  Also, Indian's believe that animals had equal intelligence to man and that all objects had natural feeling.
        A Wintu women in 1930 went to express the way the Whites were against nature and how nature voiced itself against the whites. In the writing, I admired how the wintu women took a very peaceful stand against the whites. For example, she identified herself as the "river" . As a river, she carried no resentful or having hate for the aliens drying up the river. The Wintu women expressed humbleness and peacefulness instead by indicating the river as a object of feeling. Through her humbleness, she felt the river was victorious in the end. There are other ways and means of being victorious rather then fighting with hate. I found this true to my own experience because I believe all objects, nonhuman or human- should be respected and treated as they are of great value; regardless of our own definitions of value.
        One Abrahamic Christian stand point that has common ground or some similarity towards Indian believes is the continuation of the after life. The life one chooses determines how that person will live during the afterlife. The only difference is that in a Abraham belief is that you will go to heaven or hell after you die Vs. Sierra Miwok belief that the consequent of your lifestyle determines what animal you will be reborn as. The common ground for both believes is that there is a consequences or cause and effect for the lifestyle you choose or actions you commit. This is true to my own experience in the believes of the afterlife. I believe that our actions will determine where our spirits will go and who we will be transformed as.
          Indians were also very conservative and made use of what ever animals they killed. They believed that no part of the animal should go unwasted. I strongly believe we should take this approach and make use of what ever animals we hunt for.I also do not believe in killing animals as a sport, but only as an neccesity to survival.
        The Indians were different in many aspects as well. It is very difficult to assume that we would share closer customs or if our customs would be slightly different if I were born of a world without the technology we have today. We should also assume we should be more efficient as the Indians because we have the technology and ability to do so but are not.

Sunday, April 17, 2011

Last Man & Redwood


the following Blog is expected to expand over these next few months while I take a environmental ethics course...Class starts May 9th.

Richard Sylvan inspired me to write this poem
Also wrote this for my 105 reasoning class for EC.

I am the Last Man-& this is the Last Tree
In its shade I pondered at mankind’s withering dust
All of man quickly skittered and disappeared in the crust
Expect me
And the last Redwood Tree
For the sake of mankind & Moral Standing
I stare at this tree, my ax…. & tree stairs at me as I asked
Who will value you once I am gone?
Humans created value and without me value cannot live on
Should I respect you- as you are?
Or should I just pick at you until you fall part? 
And this ax impedes my ability to think well
Wait, I can’t be that man lost from axillaries burning in hell

So I re-think my thoughts from the start
You are an Instrumental value & also intrinsic-
The beautiful part is you play both parts and never meant it

 So will it make a difference if I kill this tree
Or should I reflect on moral standings defined by a destroyed society?

 Then I thought how men planted towers that touch the sky-
And grew empires which never survived-

And yet you survived with little or no perspective
You don’t even know what that means
even as we humans lived with principle and stood corrected-
yet we are still going extinct...