Lee’s Intrinsic values on Troika Thoughts

Keekok Lee discusses three main perspective views on how value is determined and presented in modern day environmental ethics. Lee is also very successful in comparing and contrasting his own view with both J. Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston’s distinguish views of the source and locus surrounding intrinsic value. The first argument presented by Callicott is fueled by the idea that “humans consciousness is the source of all value” and that “value is no more then a subjective feeling of human individuals” (Lee [Callicott 142]). This argument is made to draw a comparison with Rolston’s view. This is done by introducing how Rolston takes different approaches by making the powerful analysis that “humans are merely the beholders of the value” and that “nature is the locus and the source of value” (Rolston 142). This carries on to the idea that humans may have discovered items in which have value already; this value is one that is preexisting without humans. Lee also draws in a third argument which based on an “argument of metaphysical queerness” against the “objectivity” of values. Lee seems to be successful in using all three hypotheses in what appears to be numerous dialectical critics /counter arguments. He uses the framework of all three scholars against each other and then uses the framework of all the authors to build his own conclusion. This is very clever.

In these three arguments, Lee does not necessarily have to be persuasive or use a degree of rhetoric to lure his audience towards his target. Lee takes a more inviting approach of this argument by elaborating and exploring the differences of these three arguments. This allows the readers to see these respectful insights of how value may be interpreted from these philosophical perspectives. After Lee explores these three ideals, he smoothly conveys me into agreeing with his final conclusions by using the existing framework of the previously discussed philosophers. Yes, there is more then one conclusion being made by Lee.

Lee discusses how Callicott completes an argument by informing us that natural beings are members of the same biotic community; sympathy for fellow members can be therefore be extended to fellow members of the same biotic community. In other words, Callicott want his readers to understand that because we are all from the same living community-it is possible that Humean/ Darwinian bioempethic moral metaphysics show how it is possible for values to be conferred by humans without being necessarily centered by humans/ or from a anthropogenic stand point. Rolston denies this and argues it is “a fallacy of the misplaced location of values” (Rolston pg 142). This is where the argument of nonhuman nature is described as not the locus but the source of value and that humans discovered such values but do not generate them.

Lee exemplifies how sources should be seen from a Cartesian/ Kantian thesis of rational linguistic capacity posse by humans and how to resolve the conflict of between Callicott and Rolston. Lee discusses how there are two types of value: A) being valuable “for itself,” and B) being valuable “in itself.” He then examines the ladder between humans and nonhumans in which are connected with the integrity to strive. Lee continues to dive deep on Value in which I interpreted on two very complex levels. The first is articulate value being recognized by consciousness, reason and capacity for language which is unique and related to humans. This is being valuable “in itself” and recognizing articulated value as described in letter B. The second type of value is based on nonhuman nature and its possession of intrinsic value as described being valuable “for itself” (A). These are mutely enacted values. This view supports Rolston’s theory of value that nature is the holder of value and that humans are the beholders of value. This where Lee takes some of the existing framework in recognizing articulated and mutely acted values and builds his argument concerning non anthropogenic views and so forth. Lee expresses that this fails to address articulated value and mutely enacted values. He also continues to describe and define value from his perceptive which bears some similarities with Rolston’s theory. The formula Lee provided, which yes, helped dearly, is described as “object O is to an entity, A, in satisfying an end goal, then O has instrumental value for A. If A stands for a human agent and O for a rabbit or a tree, then the nonhuman part of nature clearly has instrumental value for human agents” (Pg142-143). Lee then go’s to elaborating how A may also stand for a “nonhuman agent, such as an animal and O for a bush” (Lee Pgg 143); thus illustrating that nonhuman objects can also share this enacted value with other nonhuman objects. In my words, this here is the birthstone of nonhuman objects being able to sustain value regardless of lacking cognition, consciences or subjective feelings. This here can be described as instrumental value because object A is at value to object B or vice versa- even with the absent of humans. Lee continues to describe if instrumental value exist without humans, then intrinsic value which can be characterized as instrumental value must also exist without humans. After retouching the surface, I liked how Lee reestablishes his main theses to guide his readers. Below I have outlined the main points as Lee does on page 143 before entering section 4.

2. The existences of instrumental Value in nature is independent of the existences of humans
3. The existence of intrinsic value (a) in nature is also independent of the existence of humans
4. It follows from (2) that humans are not the only source of values
5. It follows from (1) & (2) that humans are not he only loci r bearers of intrinsic value

Lee continues to add other counter-arguments in which describe deeper meaning of how nonhuman animals cannot recognize “a good of one’s own.” This concept is having the ability recognize instrumental value in action. The problem is others argue that nonhuman animals cannot be capable of understanding intrinsic value as humans can from a human mindset. A cat can recognize the mouse it eats, as a bird can recognize the worm it ate or a human can be recognized as a snack for a tiger. This “good of one’s own” is visible to nonhumans only in this sense. Lee argues that beings can be bearers of intrinsic value here, and then animals clearly are such bearers of intrinsic value themselves. Being unable to simply exemplify such features does not mean that intrinsic value is void. In the ethics of Kant, it just means that humans are capable of pondering issues based on our moral, wrong from right or justice. To agree with this hypothesis is agreeing that humans are the only ones unique enough to recognize intrinsic value and are the source of it. Lee finds this troublesome because it ignores the value of our planet which was preexistent before humans. This ignores a world that is nonexistent of humans or a time that was post-human. Lee clearly is now challenging what Callicott calls scientific naturalism. Scientific naturalism is the arbitrary projection of human feelings or emotions which Callicott bases his argument on. This becomes more subjective and confines science/ and value to just human projections.

Lee continues to discuss the metaphysics of science naturalism and value vs. disvalue. He gives an example of how we can clearly see how a plant and animal maintain their function and integrity. This is the process of intrinsic value. He then goes on to describe how the absence of human consciousness makes no difference of this integrity. He also describes the absence of humans means the absence of regret or loss. This leads to a biotic point of nature that there is value and disvalue and that earth is not value free. This leads to another projection of human feeling towards the world. Lee believes that recognizing disvalue with our own attitudes simply is just instrumental value. This is a part of preserving our functional integrity and this world. He then weighs value and disvalue on two relevant aspects on page 144. Lee states, “in the absence of humans and their unique type of conciseness’ and reason, value (whether instrumental or intrinsic) are simple mutely enacted in the world” (Lee pg 144) . Our cognition, ability to think or articulate this process begs the question that nature is here to serve us. This complicates the issue and confuses me as the reader. But then Lee taps into how this new dimension does not necessarily mean it is no longer a projection of human feelings, thoughts or cognition but rather a modification of scientific naturalism. Our human consciousness is the source of “recognized articulated value.” It should be noted that this value is not simply the arbitrary product of humans but a discovery made by humans. Lee also discusses this would be contrary this scientific naturalism to study it subjectively instead to study this world objectively.

Lee closes his publication by reinstating his conclusion in section 6 and 7 (pg 145). He briefly discusses his main points: recognizing articulate values in contrast with mutely enacted values, distinguishing Callicott and Rolston’s stand on value and assessing the metaphysics of scientific naturalism. I enjoyed Lee’s concluding words that human and nonhumans are have intrinsic value as to instrumentally mutual value with each other. He even discusses that the earth’s biota has been here longer then our current existing time of human history; it is only our unique consciousness that allows us to see this.